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[W]e can attest to the vital importance of candor and confidentiality
in the Solicitor General’s decisionmaking process . . . . Our
decisionmaking process require[s] the unbridled, open exchange of
ideas—an exchange that simply cannot take place if attorneys have
reason to fear that their private recommendations are not private at
all, but vulnerable to public disclosure. Attorneys inevitably will
hesitate before giving their honest, independent analysis if their
opinions are not safeguarded from future disclosure. High-level
decisionmaking requires candor, and candor in turn requires
confidentiality.1

INTRODUCTION
Government lawyers are regulated by the ethical rules of the state
in which they are members of the bar.2 In most states, professional
responsibility rules of confidentiality do “not distinguish between
government and private sector lawyers.”3 As a result, government
lawyers are under an ethical obligation to comply with their clients’
instructions.4 The scope of protections provided by asserting the
attorney-client privilege in the face of a grand jury subpoena,
however, is not clear.5 Given that over 40,000 lawyers serve our
federal government in some capacity, a clear ethical obligation should
be provided.6 An expanding government in the current regulatory
regime will require more lawyers to provide counsel to government

1. Letter from Seth P. Waxman et al., Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering, to Patrick
Leahy, Chairman, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary (June 24, 2002), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2002-10-07/html/CREC-2002-10-07-pt1PgS10031.htm.
2. Jennifer Wang, Note, Raising the Stakes at the White House: Legal and
Ethical Duties of the White House Counsel, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 115, 131–32
(1994).
3. See Kathleen Clark, Government Lawyers and Confidentiality Norms, 85
WASH. U. L. REV. 1033, 1035 (2007).
4. William Josephson & Russell Pearce, To Whom Does the Government
Lawyer Owe the Duty of Loyalty When Clients Are in Conflict?, 29 HOW. L.J. 539,
563 (1986).
5. John Damin, Comment, Thawing the Chill Between Government Attorneys

and Their Clients: The Need for Legislative Intervention in Protecting the
Governmental Attorney-Client Privilege, 111 PENN ST. L. REV. 1009, 1010–11 (2007).
6. See Cornell W. Clayton, Introduction: Politics and the Legal Bureaucracy, in
GOVERNMENT LAWYERS: THE FEDERAL LEGAL BUREAUCRACY AND PRESIDENTIAL
POLITICS 1 (Cornell W. Clayton ed., 1995).
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officials so the government can “function efficiently and effectively.”7
Leaving the attorney-client privilege without clear boundaries for
these lawyers is a cause for great professional concern.
Government lawyers advise on policy issues, issue legal advice on
various matters, and serve as counselors at the highest levels of
government.8 Shouldn’t the privilege apply to them in the same
manner as those lawyers serving in the private sector? What if the
government official seeking legal advice may face incarceration due
to illegal policies or public corruption? Some would point to the
recent “torture memos” as a means of cautioning against a desire for
equal ethical obligations.9 Others suggest that whistleblower statutes
and other mandated reporting requirements reduce the efficacy of
this argument.10 However, a different set of rules for government
lawyers can be confusing when implemented in practice.11 Further,
systematically reducing the privilege could have great consequences
for the profession of lawyering. As Michael Greco, former President
of the American Bar Association (ABA) stated,
In the end, erosion of the attorney-client privilege will marginalize
the lawyer and the lawyer’s ability to defend liberty and pursue
justice. Erosion of the lawyer-client relationship will lead to the
diminishment of the lawyer’s role in society because clients will no
longer entrust confidences with and seek counsel from their lawyers.
And such diminishment will lead to a less effective, less respected,
and greatly reduced lawyer’s role in society not only in particular
client matters, but more broadly.12

7. See Nathan P. Hansen, Note, Attempting to Cure Conflicts of Interests in the
Federal Government: One Federal Agency’s Attempt to Recapture the Trust of
Americans, 27 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 163, 164 (2005).
8. W. Bradley Wendel, Government Lawyers, Democracy, and the Rule of Law,
77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1333, 1335 (2009); see also Peter M. Shane, Executive Branch
Self-Policing in Times of Crisis: The Challenges for Conscientious Legal Analysis, 5 J.
NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 507, 511 (2012).
9. See generally Jesselyn Radack, Tortured Legal Ethics: The Role of the
Government Advisor in the War on Terrorism, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (2006).
10. James E. Moliterno, The Federal Government Lawyer’s Duty to Breach
Confidentiality, 14 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 633, 634 (2005).
11. Walter Pincus, No Clear Legal Answer: The Uncertain State of the
Government Attorney-Client Privilege, 4 GREEN BAG 2D 269 (2001) (arguing that
recent decisions by several circuit courts have left “government attorneys . . . in a
legal no-man’s land”).
12. Michael S. Greco, President, Am. Bar Ass’n, Address at Am. College of Trial
Lawyers on Defense of Attorney Client Privilege (Apr. 8, 2006).
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Although the notion of an attorney-client privilege for government
lawyers is relatively new,13 the underlying principles remain the
same.14 Dean Wigmore provides one of the fundamental descriptions
of the privilege in his oft-cited treatise:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional
legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating
to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at
his instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or
by the legal adviser, (8) except the protection be waived.15

Government lawyers inherently share the “same broad
confidentiality obligation” as private sector attorneys.16 However,
this obligation is “tempered by the fact that [the lawyer] has a deeper
obligation to the public.”17 Completely abrogating the privilege
would have the effect of placing the government lawyer at a
disadvantage in both civil and criminal litigation.18 Courts have not
been clear as to how far the privilege should extend given the unique
obligations of government lawyers.19 Before 1996, there was no legal
precedent available on whether the government attorney-client
privilege applied in the criminal context.20 This is an important
consideration in the assertion of the privilege for government clients
13. See Patricia E. Salkin & Allyson Phillips, Eliminating Political Maneuvering:
A Light in the Tunnel for the Government Attorney-Client Privilege, 39 IND. L. REV.
561, 564 (2006) (noting that prior to 1967 “there was little application of the privilege
in the government context at all”).
14. See STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & KENNETH R. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF
EVIDENCE MANUAL 348 (4th ed. 1986) (explaining that “[o]rganizations like
corporations and government entities may claim privilege”).
15. 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2292
(John T. McNaughton rev. 1961); see also Kerri R. Blumenauer, Note, Privileged or

Not? How the Current Application of the Government Attorney-Client Privilege
Leaves the Government Feeling Unprivileged, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 75, 79 (2006)
(listing the elements of the privilege).
16. Clark, supra note 3, at 1035.
17. Jack B. Weinstein, Judicial Notice and the Duty to Disclose Adverse
Information, 51 IOWA L. REV. 807, 810 (1966).
18. 2 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE
SECOND § 191 (1994) (stating that “[d]enial of the privilege would put public entities
at an unfair disadvantage in both criminal prosecutions and civil litigation”).
19. Compare In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910 (8th Cir.
1997) (holding that privilege did not extend to the White House), and In re Lindsey,
158 F.3d 1263 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding that the President could not invoke the
privilege before a federal grand jury), with In re Grand Jury Investigation, 399 F.3d
527 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that the Office of the Governor could invoke the privilege
in a federal grand jury investigation).
20. Amanda Dickmann, Note, In re Lindsey: A Needless Void in the Government
Attorney-Client Privilege, 33 IND. L. REV. 291, 299–300 (1999).
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because “they need the candid legal advice that only the attorneyclient privilege can guarantee.”21
This idea then ignites the debate as to who exactly is the
government attorney’s client.22 Among the possibilities listed by one
commentator are the public, the government as a whole, branches of
government, agencies, and agency heads.23 Others have suggested the
President as a potential client due to his role as the head of the
Executive branch.24 The ABA has clarified that the duty of an
organizational lawyer, and therefore representation of a client,
extends to governmental organizations as well.25 Identifying the client
is critical, as it serves as the “triggering event” for a wide gamut of
professional responsibilities.26
A former Attorney General argued for recognizing a higher calling
to the public in the performance of a government lawyer’s duty.27
This idea that a government lawyer possesses “a higher duty to the
public is not limited to the criminal context.”28 One rationale for this
duty could be that the privilege serves to “encourag[e] internal

21. Adam M. Chud, Note, In Defense of the Government Attorney-Client
Privilege, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1682, 1686 (1999).
22. See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, Who “Owns” the Government’s AttorneyClient Privilege?, 83 MINN. L. REV. 473, 489 (1998) (“The client is the United States
Government.”); Bryan S. Gowdy, Note, Should the Federal Government Have an
Attorney-Client Privilege?, 51 FLA. L. REV. 695, 710–11 (1999) (recognizing courts’
assumption that “only the government entity, and not its individual employees, has
the power to invoke or waive the privilege”). Scholars have long debated who
qualifies as the client of the government civil litigator. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Essay,
Government Lawyers’ Ethics in a System of Checks and Balances, 54 U. CHI. L. REV.
1293 (1987) (arguing that the agency or department should be seen as the client).
23. Roger C. Cramton, The Lawyer As Whistleblower: Confidentiality and
Government Lawyer, 5 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 291, 296 (1991).
24. James R. Harvey, III, Note, Loyalty in Government Action Litigation:
Department of Justice Representation of Agency Clients, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1569, 1570 (1996).
25. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13 cmt. 9 (2012) (“The duty defined
in this Rule applies to governmental organizations.”). The ABA also notes that
defining the client in the government context is an arduous task. Id.
26. Joshua Panas, Note, The Miguel Estrada Confirmation Hearings and the
Client of A Government Lawyer, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 541, 543 (2004).
27. Griffin Bell, The Attorney-General: The Federal Government’s Chief Lawyer
and Chief Litigator, or One Among Many?, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 1049, 1069 (1978)
(“Although our client is the government, in the end we serve a more important
constituency: the American people.”).
28. Jesselyn Radack, The Government Attorney-Whistleblower and the Rule of
Confidentiality: Compatible at Last, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 125, 140 (2003).
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investigations . . . and ensur[es] future compliance with the law.”29
Others acknowledge the historical justifications for serving the public
interest offered by courts and legislatures.30 Further, it is argued that
the “government lawyer represents a public-abiding client whose
genuine interests” cannot be protected “by the same level of secrecy”
as a private client.31 For state and municipal government lawyers, this
also causes unique concerns when determining whose interests to
serve during representation.32
Another unique circumstance facing government lawyers is the
divide over whether the attorney-client privilege can be equally
exerted in civil and criminal cases.33 Most courts have assumed the
privilege exists in areas involving civil litigation.34 The Supreme
Court has insisted that there is “there is no case authority” justifying a
different application “in criminal and civil cases.”35 However, there
exists a circuit split regarding the assertion of the government
attorney-client privilege before a federal grand jury.36
The Eighth Circuit in In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum
recognized the existence of a government attorney-client privilege but
29. Lisa E. Toporek, Comment, “Bad Politics Makes Bad Law”: A Comment on
the Eighth Circuit’s Approach to the Governmental Attorney-Client Privilege, 86
GEO. L.J. 2421, 2428 (1998).
30. See Steven K. Berenson, Public Lawyers, Private Values: Can, Should, and
Will Government Lawyers Serve the Public Interest?, 41 B.C. L. REV. 789, 794–97
(2000).
31. Moliterno, supra note 10, at 634.
32. See, e.g., Ross v. City of Memphis, 423 F.3d 596 (6th Cir. 2005) (involving city
police department promotion process); State ex rel Thomas v. Schneider, 130 P.3d
991 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006) (involving testimony by attorney before grand jury);
Suffolk Constr. Co. v. Div. of Capital Asset Mgmt., 870 N.E.2d 33 (Mass. 2007)
(involving conflict with public records law and privilege).
33. See Patricia E. Salkin, Beware: What You Say to Your (Government) Lawyer

May Be Held Against You: The Erosion of Government Attorney-Client
Confidentiality, 35 URB. LAW. 283, 289–90 (2003) (asserting that there is a “sharp
distinction” between applying the privilege in civil and criminal cases despite the
warnings this would create a “uncertain privilege”).
34. See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 399 F.3d 527, 532–33 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing
several cases to support the assumption); In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1271 (D.C.
Cir. 1998).
35. Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 408–09 (1998) (noting that
only “one commentator ventures such a suggestion”).
36. Compare In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263 (holding that the President could not
invoke the privilege before a federal grand jury), and In re Grand Jury Subpoena
Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that privilege did not extend to
the White House), with In re Grand Jury Investigation, 399 F.3d 527 (holding that the
Office of the Governor could invoke the privilege in a federal grand jury
investigation).
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did not find that it extended to the federal grand jury context.37 The
court’s rationale focused on a weighing of interests and an assertion
that the public interest is best served by not recognizing the privilege
in “criminal proceedings inquiring into the actions of public
officials.”38 The D.C. Circuit in In re Lindsey also ruled against the
privilege utilizing a balancing test.39 There, the court found that the
necessity of open government and the sake of the public interest
outweighed the potential harms of “chill[ing] some communications
between government officials and government lawyers.”40 The
Seventh Circuit, in a case involving state officials, also ruled that the
privilege does not extend because government lawyers have a
“responsibility to act in the public interest.”41 On the other hand, the
Second Circuit has held that the government attorney-client privilege
does exist and should be extended in the federal grand jury context.42
Part I of this Note explores the history and fundamental
justifications of the attorney-client privilege. Further, it looks at the
evolution of the attorney-client privilege as an organizational
privilege. Finally, this Part focuses on the limitations of the privilege
and its impact on public policy considerations. It specifically
highlights the crime-fraud exception as one of the paramount
limitations on the attorney-client privilege.
Part II of this Note will explore the rationales of both courts and
commentators rejecting the government attorney-client privilege in
this context.
The rationales supporting an extension of the
government attorney-client privilege will then be presented for
analysis.
Part III offers a solution for government lawyers who seek to assert
the attorney-client privilege. First, it is paramount that government
lawyers’ clients be clearly identified in the beginning of their
representation. To facilitate this process and remove the murkiness
that exists, this Note suggests that the client should be defined as the
government organization represented by the duly appointed
constituents the lawyer seeks to represent.
By limiting the
representation to this capacity, the lawyer can effectively counsel his

37. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910.
38. Id. at 921.
39. In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
40. Id. at 1276.
41. In re A Witness Before the Special Grand Jury 2000-2, 288 F.3d 289, 294 (7th
Cir. 2002).
42. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 399 F.3d 527 (2d Cir. 2005).
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or her client and avoid the uncertainty of trying to ascertain what is
“in the public interest.” Second, this Note also rejects the balancing
test offered by some commentators as impractical and not logically
supported by the traditional principles of the attorney-client privilege.
Additionally, this Note disputes the idea that the government duty of
an official implicates a reduction of the privilege in a criminal context.
Finally, this Note argues that a faithful application of the crime-fraud
exception would allow the “twin aims” of public interest to be served.
A strict adherence to the crime-fraud exception still allows the client
to maintain confidentiality and preserve the ethical integrity
demanded by public service. It also serves to negate any need for
special procedures because the crime-fraud exception serves the
necessary limiting function.
I. ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE BACKGROUND AND POLICY
JUSTIFICATIONS
This Part is intended to provide a brief introduction to the
attorney-client privilege. To fully understand the role of the
attorney-client privilege for government lawyers, “a thorough review
of the private attorney-client privilege is necessary.”43 This Part will
examine the historical background and policy justifications of the
attorney-client privilege, recognize the unique nature of entities
claiming the privilege, and finally discuss several limitations placed on
the privilege.
A. Historical Background and Constitutional Justifications
The attorney-client privilege has deep historical roots in the
profession of lawyering.44 Dean Wigmore suggested the privilege was
“unquestioned” in Elizabethan times and was the “oldest of the
privileges for confidential communications.”45 It was originally
thought to be a way to protect “the oath and honor of the attorney
43. Todd A. Ellinwood, “In the Light of Reason and Experience”: The Case for
A Strong Government Attorney-Client Privilege, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 1291, 1296
(2001).
44. See Max Radin, The Privilege of Confidential Communication Between
Lawyer and Client, 16 CALIF. L. REV. 487, 488 (1928) (“Advocates equally from very
ancient times could not be called as witnesses against their clients while the case was
in progress. Cicero in prosecuting the Roman governor of Sicily regrets that he
cannot summon the latter’s [attorney].”); see also CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER &
LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE: PRACTICE UNDER THE RULES § 5.8 (2d ed. 1999).
45. 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2290
(John T. McNaughton rev. 1961).
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rather than for the apprehensions of his client.”46 Blackstone stated
in 1768 that no attorney should be forced to reveal secrets entrusted
to him by virtue of his position.47 The Supreme Court acknowledged
early on that the privilege serves as a “seal of secrecy” and is based
“upon the necessity, in the interest and administration of justice” to
allow for “assistance [that] can only be safely and readily availed of
when free from the consequences or the apprehension of
disclosure.”48
Professor Hazard argues that the historical record is best served as
an “invitation for reconsideration” of the strength and validity of the
privilege.49 Other scholars have been resolute in their reliance upon
the historical significance of the privilege.50 Despite the debate
underlying the privilege’s historical foundations, Justice Holmes
suggests that understanding the strength of this doctrine requires such
an analysis.51
In addition to the historical analysis of the privilege, there is also a
recognition of the constitutional implications of the privilege,
particularly in criminal cases.52 Courts have found Sixth Amendment
violations when there is direct interference with the attorney-client
privilege.53 In these cases, the concern is that for effective counsel to
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. (emphasis omitted).

3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *370 (1768).
Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888).
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client
Privilege, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 1061, 1070 (1978) (“But beyond this, the historical
foundations of the privilege are not as firm as the tenor of Wigmore’s language
suggests. On the contrary, recognition of the privilege was slow and halting until
after 1800 . . . . Taken as a whole, the historical record is not authority for a broadly
stated rule of privilege.”); see also 24 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W.
GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE §
5472 (1st ed. 2012) (“There is no adequate history of the attorney-client privilege.”).
50. See Daniel R. Fischel, Lawyers and Confidentiality, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1
(1998) (noting that “the attorney-client privilege has existed for hundreds of years”);
Lloyd B. Snyder, Is Attorney-Client Confidentiality Necessary?, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 477, 480 (2002) (“Attorney-client privilege cases trace back to the 16th
century.”).
51. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469
(1897) (“The rational study of law is still to a large extent the study of history.
History must be a part of the study, because without it we cannot know the precise
scope of rules which it is our business to know.”).
52. See Joel D. Whitley, Comment, Protecting State Interests: Recognition of the
State Government Attorney-Client Privilege, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1533, 1536 (2005).
53. See Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 554 n.4 (1977); United States v.
Levy, 577 F.2d 200, 209 (3d Cir. 1978) (“Free two-way communication between client
and attorney is essential if the professional assistance guaranteed by the sixth
amendment is to be meaningful.”).
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exist, “any advice received as a result of a defendant’s disclosure to
counsel must be insulated from the government.”54 The privilege also
draws its constitutional roots in the Fifth Amendment protections
against self-incrimination.55 Scholars argue that the Fifth Amendment
offers “perhaps the clearest support for the attorney-client
privilege.”56 This argument relies on the fact that “[n]o rational
defendant would disclose damning evidence” and therefore the
attorney-client privilege plays an integral part in preserving that
capacity.57
B.

Attorney-Client Privilege Promotes Public Policy Through
Disclosure and Effective Legal Advice

Among the purposes of the privilege is to “encourage clients to
make full disclosure to their attorneys.”58 Confidential information
obtained in the course of providing legal advice is protected.59
Recognizing the public’s interest in achieving justice, the law seeks to
safeguard the confidential nature of discussions between a lawyer and
a client by “encourag[ing] full and frank communication.”60 The
principle remains that “[u]ninhibited confidence in the inviolability of
the relationship is . . . essential to the protection of a client’s legal
rights, and to the proper functioning of the adversary process.”61 As a
result, the attorney-client privilege serves to promote the “broader
public interests in the observance of law and administration of
justice.”62

54. Levy, 577 F.2d at 209.
55. See Whitley, supra note 52, at 1536.
56. Michael Jay Hartman, Comment, Yes, Martha Stewart Can Even Teach Us

About the Constitution: Why Constitutional Considerations Warrant an Extension of
the Attorney-Client Privilege in High-Profile Criminal Cases, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
867, 872 (2008).
57. Whitley, supra note 52, at 1536.
58. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976).
59. See id.
60. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 348 (1985)
(“[T]he attorney-client privilege serves the function of promoting full and frank
communications between attorneys and their clients. It thereby encourages
observance of the law and aids in the administration of justice.”); Upjohn Co. v.
United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
61. Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 862 (D.C. Cir.
1980).
62. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389.
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The party “seeking to invoke the privilege” has the burden of
“establish[ing] all the essential elements.”63 Due to the privilege’s
restrictive impact on the fact-finding process, the Court has asserted
that evidentiary privileges should “not [be] lightly created nor
expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the search of the
truth.”64 Accordingly, courts have recognized the need to narrowly
constrain the attorney-client privilege to a point that is consistent with
its underlying purposes.65 This constraint is necessary to balance the
judicial “tension” caused by an assertion of the privilege.66 It also
serves to prevent abuse of the privilege.67
C.

As an Entity Privilege

The government attorney-client privilege is an organizational
privilege.68 Many commentators often analogize it to the privilege of
a corporation.69 The privilege was extended in the corporate context
as early as 1915.70 The Seventh Circuit reiterated that the privilege

63. United States v. White, 950 F.2d 426, 430 (7th Cir. 1991); see also United
States v. Jones, 696 F.2d 1069, 1072 (4th Cir. 1982) (“The burden is on the proponent
of the attorney-client privilege to demonstrate its applicability.”).
64. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974); Damin, supra note 5, at 1015.
65. See Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 189 (1990); Fisher v. United States,
425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976); United States v. Robinson, 121 F.3d 971, 975 (5th Cir. 1997);
United States v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 119 F.3d 210, 214 (2d Cir. 1997).
66. John E. Sexton, A Post-Upjohn Consideration of the Corporate AttorneyClient Privilege, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 443, 446 (1982) (noting that a “tension exists
between the secrecy required to effectuate the privilege and the openness demanded
by the factfinding process”).
67. Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933) (“The privilege takes flight if the
relation is abused.”); United States v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285, 1292 (2d Cir. 1991)
(noting that “the attorney-client privilege cannot at once be used as a shield and a
sword”).
68. See Ellinwood, supra note 43, at 1303.
69. Jeffrey L. Goodman & Jason Zabokrtsky, The Attorney-Client Privilege and
the Municipal Lawyer, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 655, 664 (2000) (“Private corporations
provide a setting somewhat analogous to the [government] setting because both
involve the privilege as it relates to an organizational client.”). But see Melanie B.
Leslie, Government Officials as Attorneys and Clients: Why Privilege the
Privileged?, 77 IND. L.J. 469, 494 (2002) (“Even if corporations and government
entities were structurally similar, the justification for extending the attorney-client
privilege to government would rest on questionable foundations.”).
70. United States v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 236 U.S. 318, 336 (1915) (“The
desirability of protecting confidential communications between attorney and client as
a matter of public policy is too well known . . . to need extended comment now. If
such communications were required to be made the subject of examination and
publication, such enactment would be a practical prohibition upon professional
advice and assistance.”).
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“in its broad sense” should be “available to corporation[s].”71 The
ABA also addresses the concept of entity privilege in the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct.72 Courts have continued to apply the
government attorney-client privilege through the “entity” lens,
paralleling the corporate privilege.73 One commentator has asserted
that for entities “nearly all the case law concerning the attorney-client
privilege . . . involve[s] corporate clients.”74
The unique nature of a corporation requires that it “must act
through agents.”75 As a result, under the corporate privilege, entities
hold the privilege, not specific individuals.76 This raises difficulties for
application of the privilege as there are “often hundreds or even
thousands of agents” in one corporation.77 Early cases dealing with
the corporate privilege developed a variety of tests to determine who
could claim the corporation’s privilege.78 One of the predominant
tests employed was the control-group test.79
The leading Supreme Court case involving a claim of corporate
privilege, Upjohn Co. v. United States,80 involved “an internal
investigation” by a corporation of “questionable payments” to a
71. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Am. Gas Ass’n, 320 F.2d 314, 323 (7th Cir. 1963)
(holding that “based on history, principle, precedent and public policy the attorneyclient privilege in its broad sense is available to corporation[s]”).
72. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(a) (2012) (“A lawyer
employed or retained by an organization represents the organization acting through
its duly authorized constituents.”).
73. United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 86 F.R.D. 603, 621 (D.D.C. 1979); see
also Lory A. Barsdate, Note, Attorney-Client Privilege for the Government Entity,
97 YALE L.J. 1725, 1734 (1988).
74. See Pincus, supra note 11, at 278.
75. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 348 (1985)
(“[A] corporation must act through agents. A corporation cannot speak directly to
its lawyers. Similarly, it cannot directly waive the privilege when disclosure is in its
best interest. Each of these actions must necessarily be undertaken by individuals
empowered to act on behalf of the corporation.”); see also David Simon, The
Attorney-Client Privilege as Applied to Corporations, 65 YALE L.J. 953, 956 (1956).
76. See Weintraub, 471 U.S. at 348; see also In re Richard Roe, Inc., 168 F.3d 69,
72 (2d Cir. 1999).
77. See Sexton, supra note 66, at 449.
78. See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 359 (D. Mass.
1950) (holding that the privilege applied to any employee within the organization).
79. City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483, 485 (E.D.
Pa. 1962) (“[I]f the employee making the communication . . . is in a position to
control or even to take a substantial part in a decision about any action which the
corporation may take upon the advice of the attorney . . . then, in effect, he is (or
personifies) the corporation when he makes his disclosure to the lawyer and the
privilege would apply.”).
80. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
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foreign government.81 To determine the scope of the illegal action,
Upjohn’s general counsel sent out a questionnaire asking for detailed
information.82 The IRS subsequently requested this material and the
corporation denied access, claiming attorney-client privilege.83 The
lower court held the corporate context unique and limited the
privilege to “senior management.”84
The Supreme Court recognized the practical difficulties of applying
the control-group test.85 Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that the
questionnaires provided to employees were necessary for the
corporation to obtain legal advice.86 Each employee’s scope of
responsibility impacted the investigation “concerning compliance
with securities and tax laws, foreign laws.”87 The Court held that the
employee communications were protected against disclosure and
supported by the underlying principles of the attorney-client
privilege.88
D. Limitations on the Attorney Client Privilege
The attorney-client privilege is not absolute.89 The exceptions that
do exist are few because the privilege itself is inherently embedded
with limitations.90 One way for the privilege to be pierced is through
the client’s waiver of the privilege.91 Clients may impliedly waive the

81. Id. at 386.
82. See id. at 387.
83. See id. at 388.
84. Id. at 390 (citations omitted).
85. Id. at 393 (“[A]n uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be certain but
results in widely varying applications by the courts, is little better than no privilege at
all.”).
86. See id. at 394.
87. Id.
88. See id. at 395.
89. See Jason Greenberg, Comment, Swidler & Berlin v. United States. . . . And
Justice for All?, 80 B.U. L. REV. 939, 946 (2000) (“Over the years, courts have carved
out three main exceptions to the attorney-client privilege.”).
90. See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 49, § 5501 (“[There are] ‘wellestablished’ exceptions to the attorney-client privilege. These exceptions are few in
number because, unlike the hearsay rule, most of the policy limitations on the
privilege are embedded in the definition of the privilege. It is, therefore, important
that lawyers understand that in seeking access to allegedly privileged materials, the
exceptions are a last resort.”).
91. Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888) (“[I]f the client has voluntarily
waived the privilege, it cannot be insisted on to close the mouth of the attorney.”); In
re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d 289, 294 (6th
Cir. 2002) (“As a general rule, the attorney-client privilege is waived by voluntary
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privilege through their conduct or “consent to disclosure.”92 The
privilege is also waived when a client “voluntarily discloses privileged
information to a third party.”93 Testifying at trial is another method
of waiving the privilege.94
Many other limitations on the government attorney-client privilege
originate in the need for open government.95 One such limitation is
the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).96 Enacted in 1966, FOIA’s
primary goal is to create “an open government accountable to the
citizenry.”97 This allows any citizen to request information from the
federal government unless it is specifically excluded under one of nine
enumerated exceptions.98 Many courts find that exemption five—
stating that an agency is permitted to withhold “inter-agency or intraagency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law
to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency”99—
encompasses the attorney-client privilege.100 As with the privilege in
general, the burden rests on the agency when invoking the
exemption.101

disclosure of private communications by an individual or corporation to third
parties.”).
92. United States v. Dakota, 197 F.3d 821, 825 (6th Cir. 1999); In re Von Bulow,
828 F.2d 94, 101 (2d Cir. 1987).
93. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414, 1424 (3d
Cir. 1991); Comment, Stuffing the Rabbit Back into the Hat: Limited Waiver of the
Attorney-Client Privilege in an Administrative Agency Investigation, 130 U. PA. L.
REV. 1198, 1207 (1982).
94. Mathew S. Miller, Note, The Costs of Waiver: Cost-Benefit Analysis as a New
Basis for Selective Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1248,
1254–55 (2008).
95. See generally Nancy Leong, Note, Attorney-Client Privilege in the Public
Sector: A Survey of Government Attorneys, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 163, 189
(2007).
96. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006).
97. See Patricia M. Wald, The Freedom of Information Act: A Short Case Study
in the Perils and Paybacks of Legislating Democratic Values, 33 EMORY L.J. 649, 652
(1984). Wald argues that “[a]n excessive, and sometimes obsessive, passion for
governmental secrecy can threaten a secure constitutional democracy.” Id. at 654.
98. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b).
99. Id. § 552(b)(5).
100. See Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 154
(1975); Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 862 (D.C. Cir.
1980); Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Air Force, 566 F.2d 242, 252 (D.C.
Cir. 1977).
101. Coastal States Gas Corp., 617 F.2d at 863.
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Crime-Fraud Exception

Another frequently invoked exception to the attorney-client
privilege is the crime-fraud exception.102
According to the
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, the crime-fraud
exception applies when a client:
(a) consults a lawyer for the purpose, later accomplished, of
obtaining assistance to engage in a crime or fraud or aiding a third
person to do so, or
(b) regardless of the client’s purpose at the time of consultation, uses
the lawyer’s advice or other services to engage in or assist a crime or
fraud.103

The purpose of the crime-fraud exception is to keep the attorneyclient privilege from “shielding from prosecution” a client who uses
his attorney’s advice “to initiate or continue a fraudulent or criminal
activity.”104 It functions to prevent abuses and “secur[e] the integrity
of the trial process.”105 A myriad of options can give rise to the need
for the crime-fraud exception.106 The fact that a client may be
culpable or engaging in other criminal activity does not automatically
invoke the exception.107 An attorney’s knowledge or awareness of his
client’s intent does not matter for purposes of the exception.108 The
client’s specific understanding of whether the act he is communicating
about is criminal is also irrelevant.109 What does matter for the
purposes of the exception is the “client’s intent at the time he sought

102. See Geraldine Gauthier, Note, Dangerous Liaisons: Attorney-Client
Privilege, the Crime-Fraud Exception, ABA Model Rule 1.6 and Post-September 11
Counter-Terrorist Measures, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 351 (2002).
103. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 82 (2000).
104. Rachel A. Hutzel, Note, Evidence: The Crime Fraud Exception to AttorneyClient Privilege—United States v. Zolin, 109 S. Ct. 2619 (Interim Ed. 1989), 15 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 365, 372 (1990).
105. Colin Miller, The Purpose-Driven Rule: Drew Peterson, Giles v. California,
and the Transferred Intent Doctrine of Forfeiture by Wrongdoing, 112 COLUM. L.
REV. SIDEBAR 228, 235 (2012).
106. Hutzel, supra note 104, at 372 (listing conspiracy, “solicitation of illegal
assistance,” and “performance of legal services without the attorney knowing of the
client’s tortious or criminal purpose” as possible actions warranting the exception).
107. In re Richard Roe, Inc., 68 F.3d 38, 40 (2d Cir. 1995) (“[T]he crime-fraud
exception does not apply simply because privileged communications would provide
an adversary with evidence of a crime or fraud.”).
108. In re BankAmerica Corp. Sec. Litig., 270 F.3d 639, 642 (8th Cir. 2001).
109. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 82 cmt. c (2000)
(“The client need not specifically understand that the contemplated act is a crime or
fraud.”).
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the attorney’s advice.”110 One should not be able to obtain protection
for communications that were received through bad faith.111
The Court first addressed the crime-fraud exception in Clark v.
United States.112 Clark involved the issue of a juror being charged
with criminal contempt for providing misleading statements.113 The
Court recognized a need for the privilege to be overcome in
circumstances of that nature.114 Over fifty years later, the Court
expanded its jurisprudence in this area in United States v. Zolin, a
case involving an IRS investigation into L. Ron Hubbard, the Church
of Scientology founder.115
The Zolin Court created a two-part test for determining whether
the crime-fraud exception applies.116 In doing so, the Court did not
rule on “the quantum of proof necessary ultimately to establish . . .
the crime-fraud exception.”117 It first ruled that in camera inspections
of privileged materials could be an appropriate method of reviewing
privileged materials.118 Before allowing the in camera inspection, the
Court determined a threshold should be met.119 To properly invoke
this exception, the moving party must establish a prima facie case.120

110. Auburn K. Daily & S. Britta Thornquist, Has the Exception Outgrown the
Privilege?: Exploring the Application of the Crime-Fraud Exception to the AttorneyClient Privilege, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 583, 585 (2003).
111. H. Lowell Brown, The Crime-Fraud Exception to the Attorney-Client
Privilege in the Context of Corporate Counseling, 87 KY. L.J. 1191, 1216–17 (1999).
112. 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933) (“A client who consults an attorney for advice that will
serve him in the commission of a fraud will have no help from the law. He must let
the truth be told.”).
113. Id. at 6.
114. Id. at 14 (“[T]he privilege does not apply where the relation giving birth to it
has been fraudulently begun or fraudulently continued.”).
115. United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554 (1989).
116. Id. at 572 (requiring first “a showing of a factual basis adequate to support a
good faith belief by a reasonable person” that an in camera review of materials “may
reveal evidence to establish the claim” and second, allowing for an “in camera review
to determine the applicability of the crime-fraud exception”).
117. Id. at 563.
118. Id. at 565 (“We conclude that no express provision of the Federal Rules of
Evidence bars . . . in camera review, and that it would be unwise to prohibit it in all
instances as a matter of federal common law.”).
119. Id. at 570 (“In addressing this question, we attend to the detrimental effect, if
any, of in camera review on the policies underlying the privilege and on the orderly
administration of justice in our courts. We conclude that some such showing must be
made.”).
120. In re Int’l Sys. & Controls Corp. Sec. Litig., 693 F.2d 1235, 1242 (5th Cir. 1982)
(noting that a prima facie case has “[evidence] [s]uch as will suffice until contradicted
and overcome by other evidence . . . [a] case which has proceeded upon sufficient
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Professor Fried notes that courts recently have begun to favor a
“lesser burden.”121 This may be in part due to the fact that courts
struggle with determining what reaches this “required evidentiary
level.”122 What is clear is that courts have repeatedly held conclusory
allegations of fraud to be insufficient to invoke the crime-fraud
exception.123
II. DISPUTE OVER WHETHER THE GOVERNMENT ATTORNEYCLIENT PRIVILEGE SHOULD EXIST IN A FEDERAL GRAND JURY
PROCEEDING
Most courts agree that government attorneys can claim attorneyclient privilege in a civil context.124 Where the circuits split is whether
that same privilege can be invoked when a government attorney is
called before a grand jury.125 Cases arising out of the Eighth and D.C.
Circuits during the Whitewater investigation rejected the extension of
the privilege between confidential communications of the Office of
the White House Counsel and the Office of the President.126 The
Seventh Circuit, following the rationale of these two circuits, also
denied the privilege in a case involving an investigation into a
potential “licenses for bribes” scheme by the Illinois Secretary of
State.127 The Second Circuit, however, broke from the ranks in 2005
and upheld the government attorney-client privilege in the grand jury

proof to that stage where it will support [a] finding if evidence to the contrary is
disregarded” (citation omitted)).
121. David J. Fried, Too High a Price for Truth: The Exception to the AttorneyClient Privilege for Contemplated Crimes and Frauds, 64 N.C. L. REV. 443, 462
(1986).
122. Christopher Paul Galanek, Note, The Impact of the Zolin Decision on the
Crime-Fraud Exception to the Attorney-Client Privilege, 24 GA. L. REV. 1115, 1125
(1990).
123. Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933) (“It is obvious that it would be
absurd to say that the privilege could be got rid of merely by making a charge of
fraud.” (citations omitted)); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 87 F.3d 377, 381 (9th Cir.
1997) (finding it insufficient when the government “allege[s] that it has a sneaking
suspicion the client was engaging in or intending to engage in a crime or fraud”).
124. Damin, supra note 5, at 1010.
125. See discussion infra Part II and accompanying notes.
126. In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263 (D.C. Cir. 1998); In re Grand Jury Subpoena
Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910 (8th Cir. 1997).
127. In re A Witness Before the Special Grand Jury 2000-2, 288 F.3d 289 (7th Cir.
2002).

GLENN_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

THE CRIME-FRAUD EXCEPTION

7/14/2013 10:41 PM

1465

setting.128 Shortly thereafter, they again reiterated support for the
government attorney-client privilege in In re County of Erie.129
Courts recognize that the purpose of the attorney-client privilege is
to promote a broad public interest by encouraging client candor and
increasing the frankness of communications between clients and their
attorneys.130 Government entities are also seen as being “well-served
by the privilege” in the civil context.131 In a criminal grand jury
proceeding, however, courts and commentators have questioned the
rationale for the privilege claimed by government officials and the
entities they represent.
Part II of this Note presents and analyzes the arguments for and
against the recognition of the government attorney-client privilege in
the federal grand jury context. Part II.A provides the rationale of the
courts and commentators that have declined to extend the
government attorney-client privilege in that context. Part II.A.1
presents the argument that the underlying rationale for the corporate
privilege does not justify its application in the government context.
Part II.A.2 analyzes the argument that creating an open and honest
government is the paramount public interest that should be weighed.
Part II.A.3 offers the viewpoint that client candor is not increased
through an application of the attorney-client privilege. Part II.A.4
articulates the argument that other privileges provide adequate
protection to confidential matters between a government attorney
and his client.
Part II.B presents an integrated analysis of the opposing rationales
provided in support of extending the government attorney-client
privilege in the federal grand jury context. Part II.B.1 asserts that the
corporate analogy is relevant to the consideration of a government
attorney-client privilege. Part II.B.2 articulates the argument that
denying open discussions has a detrimental impact on society as a
whole.
Part II.B.3 presents the position that full and frank
communications are just as important in the public context as the
private context. Finally, Part II.B.4 argues that other recommended
privileges are insufficient to guard the confidential information
protected via the attorney-client privilege.
A. Declining to Extend the Government Attorney-Client
128.
129.
130.
131.

In re Grand Jury Investigation, 399 F.3d 527 (2d Cir. 2005).
473 F.3d 413 (2d Cir. 2007).
See Blumenauer, supra note 15, at 93.
Ross v. City of Memphis, 423 F.3d 596, 603 (6th Cir. 2005).
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Privilege in the Federal Grand Jury Context
Two prominent cases arose during the Clinton Whitewater scandal
that laid the foundation for the rationale that the government
attorney-client privilege should not extend in matters before a federal
grand jury. The Seventh Circuit followed this rationale in denying the
privilege in a case involving a state official in a “licenses for bribes
scandal.”132 The reasoning that each court followed is presented in
chronological order as a framework to highlight how the concept of
the privilege evolved between the three cases.

1.

In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum

In 1996, while serving as Independent Counsel during the
Whitewater investigation, Kenneth Starr served a grand jury
subpoena upon the White House requiring the production of
documents created in meetings that “pertain[ed] to several
Whitewater-related subjects.”133 The White House failed to produce
the requested documents asserting the materials were protected by
the attorney-client privilege in addition to other privileges.134 The
Office of the Independent Counsel (OIC) then moved to compel
disclosure of two previously requested sets of documents.135
The first set of notes in question involved a meeting on July 11,
1995, between Mrs. Clinton, Jane Sherburne (Special Counsel to the
President), and Mrs. Clinton’s private attorney, David Kendall.136
The subject matter of this meeting was Mrs. Clinton’s activities
following the untimely death of Vincent Foster.137 The second set of
notes was taken at various meetings on January 26, 1996 between
Mrs. Clinton, Mr. Kendall, Ms. Seligman, and John Quinn (Counsel
to the President).138 These meetings involved the topic of the
discovery of billing records from the Rose Law Firm in the White
House residency.139 Judge Wright held that the attorney-client
132. In re A Witness Before the Special Grand Jury 2000-2, 288 F.3d at 289.
133. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 913 (8th Cir. 1997).
In his role as Independent Counsel, Kenneth Starr was assigned to investigate the
Whitewater matter and to pursue evidence of any related crimes involving President
and Mrs. Clinton’s relationship to certain banking and investing organizations. Id.
134. Id. at 913–14. The White House did note the existence of nine sets of
documents that were responsive to the subpoena request. Id. at 913.
135. Id. at 914.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
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privilege applied because “Mrs. Clinton and the White House had a
‘genuine and reasonable (whether or not mistaken)’ belief that the
conversations at issue were privileged.”140 The OIC appealed this
decision and the Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded.141
The Eighth Circuit began its explanation by acknowledging the
need to “apply the federal common law of attorney-client privilege to
the situation presented by this case.”142 Using Proposed Federal Rule
of Evidence 503 as “a useful starting place,” the Eighth Circuit noted
that the rule and other commentary would only serve the “broad
proposition” that a governmental body may be a client.143 Noting a
lack of case law supporting the White House’s position that the
privilege exists in the criminal context, the Eighth Circuit then looked
to general principles regarding privileges.144 Noting that privileges are
exceptions,145 rather than standards, the court then focused on the
main underlying principles that lie at the heart of the case.146
The Eighth Circuit recognized that organizations had privileges in
criminal cases, but noted there are “important differences” between
governments and corporations and therefore rejected the argument
offered by the White House based on the Upjohn rationale.147 The
court noted in particular that the White House could not be subject to
criminal liability.148 The court also found significant the existence of a
statutory reporting requirement for executive officials regarding
criminal wrongdoing.149 Central to the opinion was the idea that the

140.
141.
142.
143.

Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 925–26.
Id. at 915.
Id. at 915–16. The Eighth Circuit also conducted an analysis of the
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers and the Uniform Rules of
Evidence regarding the specific issue at hand. Id. at 916. The court noted the
Restatement provided instructive language regarding the complexities of the exercise
of the attorney-client privilege in intra-governmental conflicts, but looked to case law
to refine the principles. Id.
144. Id. at 918.
145. Id. (“Federal common law recognizes a privilege only in rare situations.”).
Among the exceptions the court cited to: psychotherapist-patient privilege,
corporation attorney-client privilege, and qualified executive privilege. Id.
146. See id. at 919.
147. Id. at 920.
148. Id.
149. Id. The statute in question is 28 U.S.C. § 535(b) (2006). The relevant portion
states: “[a]ny information . . . received in a department or agency of the executive
branch of the Government relating to violations of Federal criminal law involving
Government officers and employees shall be expeditiously reported to the Attorney
General.” Id.
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weight of the public interest is greater than the need for
confidentiality for the government attorney.150 The court ultimately
held that “the White House may not use the attorney-client privilege”
to avoid producing the documents the OIC requested under
subpoena.151

2.

In re Lindsey

The prosecutorial jurisdiction for the OIC was expanded in 1998 to
consider matters beyond the financial issues surrounding Whitewater,
namely possibly perjured testimony in the lawsuit by Paula Jones
against President Clinton.152 The grand jury issued a subpoena for
Bruce Lindsey, Deputy White House Counsel and the President’s
personal attorney, to testify regarding any information he may have
related to the perjury claims surrounding the Jones lawsuit.153 In
three appearances before the grand jury, Lindsey invoked the
attorney-client privilege and failed to address the questions presented
to him.154 Chief Judge Johnson, on a motion by the OIC, compelled
disclosure of the requested documents.155 The President appealed the
decision, and the case proceeded to the D.C. Circuit.156
The D.C. Circuit, in a per curiam opinion, recognized that a
government attorney-client privilege exists for public requests for
information, and is guided by recognized common law principles.157

150. Id. at 921 (“We believe the strong public interest in honest government and in
exposing wrongdoing by public officials would be ill-served by recognition of a
governmental attorney-client privilege applicable in criminal proceedings inquiring
into the actions of public officials.”).
151. Id. at 924.
152. In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1266–67 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (stating the order
expanding jurisdiction authorized investigation into “whether Monica Lewinsky or
others suborned perjury, obstructed justice, intimidated witnesses, or otherwise
violated federal law”).
153. Id.
154. Id. Lindsey also claimed executive privilege, personal attorney-client
privilege and work product privilege. Id. This Note focuses only on the government
attorney-client privilege, though the other claimed privileges do raise interesting
constitutional and ethical concerns as well.
155. Id. (“[T]he privilege is qualified in the grand jury context and may be
overcome upon a sufficient showing of need for the subpoenaed communications and
unavailability from other sources.”).
156. Id.
157. See id. at 1268–69. The court provides as examples cases involving the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), and the use of exemption five. Id. at 1268.
Additionally, the D.C. Circuit looked to Proposed Rule 503 as evidence of the
federal common law. Id. at 1269.
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In addition, the court noted in practice that government attorneys
evinced a “common understanding” of the privilege’s function in
litigation involving FOIA requests and individual suits against
government officials.158 The court noted, however, that the claimed
privilege applied only to legal advice provided.159 Finding at least one
occasion of legal advice, the D.C. Circuit attempted to decide
“whether the government attorney-client privilege could be invoked
in these circumstances.”160
The court first rejected the line of cases arising out of the FOIA
exemption as “not necessarily control[ling] the application of the
privilege.”161
The court’s analysis focused on the competing
considerations presented when two government entities face each
other in litigation.162 The court reasoned that the complex structure,
tradition, and function of government operations should be
considered when deciding upon an “expansion of the privilege to all
governmental entities” across all types of litigation.163
The main policy argument presented again revolved around the
public interest in disclosure.164 The court asserted that public trust
“strongly militates” against allowing the privilege to exist in a
criminal investigation of government wrongdoing.165
Invoking
Madisonian principles, the D.C. Circuit argued that “transparent and
accountable government” protects the public trust.166 Citing to
Robert Bork, among others, the court also strongly suggested the
government counsel’s role in reporting wrongdoing is instrumental in

158. Id. The court cited to letters provided by Theodore Olson and Antonin Scalia
in their former official capacities as Assistant Attorney Generals in the Office of the
Legal Counsel (OLC). Id.
159. Id. at 1270 (“Thus, Lindsey’s advice on political, strategic, or policy issues . . .
would not be shielded from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege.”).
160. Id. at 1271.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1271–72.
163. Id. at 1272.
164. See id. at 1273 (“Unlike a private practitioner, the loyalties of a government
lawyer therefore cannot and must not lie solely with his or her client agency.”).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1273–74 (“A popular Government, without popular information, or the
means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both.
Knowledge will forever govern ignorance: And a people who mean to be their own
Governors, must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives.” (quoting
Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF
JAMES MADISON 103 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910))).
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protecting the public trust.167 While the court noted that limiting the
privilege in the grand jury context may “chill some communications”
between the client and advocate, it found this to be an acceptable
course of action.168 The court ultimately held that government
attorneys could not invoke the attorney-client privilege in the same
manner as private counsel, especially in the grand jury context, due to
significant public interest concerns.169

3.

In re A Witness Before the Special Grand Jury

The issue of attorney-client privilege in the context of a federal
criminal investigation was expanded beyond federal executive
officials in a case before the Seventh Circuit.170 The federal
government during “Operation Safe Road” was investigating the
Illinois Secretary of State’s Office for an alleged “licenses for bribes”
scheme.171 The federal government sought the cooperation of Roger
Bickel, who had been serving as the Secretary of State’s legal
counsel.172 However, the former Secretary (and later Governor),
George Ryan, informed Bickel that he had not waived the attorneyclient privilege regarding any of his prior conversations with Bickel.173
After serving a subpoena for Bickel to appear before the grand jury,
the government moved to compel him to testify.174 Chief Judge
Aspen granted the motion and Ryan appealed.175
The Seventh Circuit held that the client for whom the privilege
applies is the State of Illinois.176 This presented a unique challenge to
the court in addressing the issue of whether the privilege differs

167. Id. at 1275.
While serving as Solicitor General during the Nixon
Administration, Bork, when offered a position on the President’s legal team, stated:
“A government attorney is sworn to uphold the Constitution. If I come across
evidence that is bad for the President, I’ll have to turn it over. I won’t be able to sit
on it like a private defense attorney.” A Conversation with Robert H. Bork, 1998
D.C. BAR REP. 9.
168. See In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1276.
169. Id. at 1278.
170. See In re A Witness Before the Special Grand Jury 2000–2, 288 F.3d 289, 290
(7th Cir. 2002).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 290–91.
175. Id. at 291.
176. Id.

GLENN_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

7/14/2013 10:41 PM

THE CRIME-FRAUD EXCEPTION

1471

between civil and criminal contexts.177 The Seventh Circuit asserted
that “government lawyers have a higher, competing duty to act in the
public interest.”178 The court also noted that government lawyers are
funded by the public and this would be a “misuse of public assets” to
allow the privilege in a criminal investigation.179 The court reasoned
that because the privilege extends to the office, and not an individual,
to offer it as an incentive for compliance is unnecessary.180 The court
asserted that the public interest and “lack of criminal liability for
government agencies” balanced against any potential need for the
privilege.181

4.

Categorical Arguments Against Extending the Government
Attorney-Client Privilege in the Federal Grand Jury Context
a.

Corporate Privilege Rationale Does Not Extend to the
Government Context

Professor Melanie B. Leslie argues that the premise that a
government entity is similar to a corporate entity is based upon a
“shaky foundation.”182 Other scholars have argued that justifying a
privilege to government organizations is “even more fallacious” when
compared to a corporate entity privilege.183 The Eighth Circuit
reasoned that there exist “important differences between the
government and nongovernmental organizations” which caution
“against the application of the principles of Upjohn.”184
Professor Leslie asserts through an analysis of pre-conduct and
post-conduct legal advice the instrumental distinctions that mar the
comparison between corporate and government entities.185 One such
distinction that can be drawn is that government officials serve in

177. See id. at 291–92 (discussing other courts and leading treatises treatment of
the privilege regarding private parties in a criminal context and how the government
attorneys privilege is viewed differently).
178. Id. at 293.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 294.
181. Id.
182. Leslie, supra note 69, at 472–73.
183. James A. Gardner, A Personal Privilege for Communications of Corporate
Clients—Paradox or Public Policy?, 40 U. DET. L.J. 299, 309, 379 (1963).
184. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 920 (8th Cir. 1997).
185. See Leslie, supra note 69, at 498–511 (discussing the differences between
corporate entities and government entities in the rationale for seeking pre-conduct
and post-conduct legal advice).
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positions of public trust.186 This position of trust weighs against using
a corporate based rationale for government officials as they are not
driven by the same “profit motives of corporations.”187
The
government’s obligation to serve the public interest in litigation
serves as a key distinction between government and private lawyers.188
Further, government officials possess “little incentive to push official
conduct to or past the law’s boundaries.”189 Rather, because
government officials serve in a public capacity, they should “favor
disclosure over concealment.”190 The Eighth Circuit found this
difference to be “perhaps, by itself, reason enough to find [the
corporate analogy] unpersuasive in this case.”191
According to the Eighth Circuit, another key difference is that
government entities cannot be subject to criminal penalties like those
a corporation could possibly face.192 A corporation has a distinct
interest in discovering employee misconduct in order to protect
itself.193 On the contrary, government entities have a statutory
responsibility to report employee misconduct.194
In fact, the
“investigation and punishment of wrongdoing” by government
officials is a central “function[] of the executive branch of
government.”195 The existence and survival of a government entity
does not rest upon their pursuit of “competitive success” by
Due to mandatory reporting
eliminating wrongdoing.196
requirements, there is no justification for using the “attorney-client
privilege as an incentive to increase compliance with the laws.”197

186. Id. at 496.
187. See Barsdate, supra note 73, at 1740–41.
188. Id. at 1738.
189. Leslie, supra note 69, at 498–99.
190. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 920 (8th Cir. 1997).
191. Id.
192. Id. (“A corporation, in contrast, may be subject to both civil and criminal
liability for the actions of its agents, and corporate attorneys therefore have a
compelling interest in ferreting out any misconduct by employees.”).
193. Leslie, supra note 69, at 521–22.
194. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 920.
195. Steven K. Berenson, The Duty Defined: Specific Obligations that Follow from
Civil Government Lawyers’ General Duty to Serve the Public Interest, 42 BRANDEIS
L.J. 13, 34 (2003).
196. Barsdate, supra note 73, at 1741.
197. In re A Witness Before the Special Grand Jury 2000-2, 288 F.3d 289, 293–94
(7th Cir. 2002).
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Open and Honest Government Is the Paramount Public Interest

Another argument against the government attorney-client privilege
is that “[p]rivileges are in direct conflict with open government.”198
The government possesses a unique responsibility to provide
information to the public “concerning government operations.”199 If
the people are not aware of what the government is doing, “then this
premise is little more than an empty promise.”200 Maintaining an
open government is often recognized as being “crucial to ensuring
that the people remain in control.”201 This has been a central tenet of
our government since the beginning of the democracy.202 Courts have
recognized allowing government secrecy will cause “[d]emocracies
[to] die behind closed doors.”203
Supporting this idea, Professor Moliterno argues that the
government has taken steps to avoid a secretive government.204
Among the significant steps taken is the passage of federal open
government laws like FOIA.205 These laws help to “ensure an
informed citizenry” and assist in “check[ing] against corruption.”206
These laws do not make all government-related information available
to the public, however, and thus have a limited reach.207

c.

Client Candor Is Not Increased Through Preservation of the
Privilege

Further distinguishing the government privilege is the rationale
that the “disincentives to candor” do not apply to government
employees.208 This argument centers on the government’s claim of
198. See Gowdy, supra note 22, at 720.
199. See Barsdate, supra note 73, at 1735.
200. See Clark, supra note 3, at 1047.
201. In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1274 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
202. Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936) (“In the ultimate, an
informed public opinion is the most potent of all restraints upon misgovernment.”).
203. Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 683 (6th Cir. 2002).
204. See Moliterno, supra note 10, at 636 (“The government has expressed this
preference by enacting statutes that either command or encourage revelation of
government wrongdoing.”).
205. Clark, supra note 3, at 1046 (listing FOIA, the Privacy Act of 1974,
Government in the Sunshine Act, Federal Advisory Committee Act, and the
Presidential Records Act of 1978 as examples of open government statutes).
206. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242
(1978).
207. Mika C. Morse, Note, Honor or Betrayal? The Ethics of Government
Lawyer-Whistleblowers, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 421, 435 (2010).
208. See Leslie, supra note 69, at 499.
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privilege involving materials that are not confidential, which would
“serve[] no compelling purpose.”209 In the post-conduct context,
Leslie argues that the government structure impacts an employee’s
desire to even claim the privilege.210 Leslie finds it more likely, during
litigation, that the government entity would waive the privilege, thus
reducing an employee’s reliance on it.211 Berenson expands on this
idea by arguing that “the government attorney’s responsibility to
serve the public interest” is clarified in areas traditionally litigated by
the government attorney.212 This requires the government attorney to
“determine whether the public official is acting in accord with the
law” and only represent those individuals.213
Another commentator, Bryan Gowdy, argues that the idea of
encouraging client candor is “too speculative” in the government
context.214 This relationship fails because the government employee’s
communications with government attorneys often “do not contain
confidential facts about the agency.”215 Noting the distinctive
interests served by corporate and government attorneys, it is argued
that government officials possess “a constitutional duty to faithfully
execute the laws.”216 They have a duty to “seek a fair result beyond
. . . the interests of the government client.”217 This has the effect of
forcing the “government lawyer to yield[] to the moral force pressing
for revelation.”218 As a result, the privilege is rendered unnecessary
for the government official who has uncertainty about the applicable
law.219
Leslie supports the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning by arguing that “a
broad government attorney-client privilege is not justified.”220 Leslie
instead argues for a “level[ing] of the playing field” as the limited
justification for the government attorney-client privilege.221 This
209. Id.
210. See id. at 506 (“The government employee in serious trouble is unlikely to
talk to government counsel, privilege or no privilege, because she knows that if she
does, her superiors will shortly learn the truth.”).
211. See id. at 507.
212. See Berenson, supra note 30, at 801.
213. Josephson & Pearce, supra note 4, at 556.
214. See Gowdy, supra note 22, at 718.
215. See Leslie, supra note 69, at 499.
216. See Gowdy, supra note 22, at 719.
217. See Barsdate, supra note 73, at 1738.
218. See Moliterno, supra note 10, at 635.
219. See Gowdy, supra note 22, at 719–20.
220. Leslie, supra note 69, at 526.
221. Id. at 527.
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justification, however, would only be allowed in cases of trial
Ultimately, Leslie argues that the underlying
preparation.222
assumptions of the government attorney-client privilege are a
“fiction.”223 Instead, she contends that by limiting the privilege it
“would make government entities more accountable to the citizens
they serve.”224

d.

Other Privileges Can Provide Sufficient Protection to
Confidential Materials

Gowdy does recognize the government’s need for secrecy in some
respects, but argues there are more appropriate tools than the
attorney-client privilege to protect that need.225 The work-product
doctrine is suggested as one way to protect the “government party’s
strategic interests in litigation.”226 This protection stems from the
needs of the attorney to adequately prepare a client’s case without
“undue and needless interference.”227 The work product doctrine
drastically reduces an opponent’s access to materials “prepared in
anticipation of litigation or for trial.”228 Information may fall under
both the work-product and attorney-client privileges, creating overlap
in protection of the information.229 Failure to protect this information
would run afoul of strong public policy considerations.230 Moliterno
also recognizes certain “discrete areas of protection” but otherwise
suggests, in cases of wrongdoing, a “government lawyer should reveal
information about a client that a private lawyer would protect.”231
Professor Leslie suggests that “top government officials” may be
encouraged to openly communicate with their counsel as a result of
the attorney-client privilege, but the executive privilege adequately

222. Id. at 528 (“The need to provide a level playing field in litigation also justifies
extending work-product-like protection to oral statements made by government
employees . . . in preparation of litigation.”).
223. Id. at 550.
224. Id.
225. Gowdy, supra note 22, at 720 (“Government lawyers need confidentiality
when preparing strategies for upcoming litigation. The work product privilege serves
this need by protecting an attorney’s mental impressions.”).
226. Barsdate, supra note 73, at 1743.
227. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947).
228. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 924 (8th Cir. 1997)
(quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)).
229. See Salkin & Phillips, supra note 13, at 604.
230. See id. at 605.
231. See Moliterno, supra note 10, at 642.
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protects the government’s need for confidentiality.232 She argues this
is the “best mechanism” to adequately “balance the need for
confidentiality with the public welfare.”233 Barsdate suggests that
information should not be disclosed under these circumstances due to
the possible “danger to the public interest.”234 The D.C. Circuit
asserts that given the circumstances surrounding claims of executive
privilege, “the need for secrecy” is arguably greater than for claims
under other forms of privilege.235 It is cautioned, however, that the
executive privilege is meant only serve to protect “frank debate
between [the] President and advisers.”236
The Eighth Circuit reasoned that the executive privilege may also
apply differently in criminal and civil contexts.237 The Nixon court
gave rise to the concept of a qualified executive privilege when it
reasoned that allowing a claim of executive privilege “would cut
deeply into the guarantee of due process of law” and further “gravely
impair the basic function of the courts.”238 As a result, the Nixon
court held that “privilege must yield” to the specific need for
evidence in a criminal trial.239
B.

Extending the Government Attorney-Client Privilege in the
Federal Grand Jury Context

In 2005, the Second Circuit split from the other circuits in allowing
the assertion of the government attorney-client privilege in a grand
jury proceeding for subpoenaed documents and communications.
Utilizing a rationale similar to that of the other circuit courts, the
Second Circuit instead came out on the side of preserving the
privilege in this context. Following up shortly on this reasoning, the
Second Circuit held in 2007 that the government attorney-client

232. See Leslie, supra note 69, at 496.
233. Id. at 473.
234. Barsdate, supra note 73, at 1744.
235. In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1998). However, the D.C.
Circuit did not get a chance to address the claim of executive privilege, as that issue
was not on appeal before the court.
236. Dickmann, supra note 20, at 296 (citing In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1285 (Tatel,
J., dissenting)).
237. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 917–18 (8th Cir.
1997).
238. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 712 (1974).
239. Id. at 713.
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privilege could apply “[a]t least in civil litigation between a
government agency and private litigants.”240

1. In re Grand Jury
The Second Circuit countered the growing restriction of the
government attorney-client privilege in 2005 when Anne George,
former Chief Legal Counsel to the Office of the Governor of
Connecticut was called to testify before a federal grand jury.241 The
investigation there involved questions over whether then-Governor
Rowland had received gifts for “favorable negotiation and awarding
of state contracts.”242 The government moved to compel George’s
testimony, and the district court withheld decision pending her
appearance before the grand jury.243 Once she appeared, the district
court ordered George to testify.244 This decision was appealed by
then-Governor Rowland and the Office of the Governor.245
The court began its analysis by framing the issue in terms of
whether the Office of the Governor could claim the privilege under
the Federal Rules of Evidence.246 The court noted that the principle
of the privilege is “well-established” despite the limited application of
case law to the specific circumstances before it.247 Although historical
determinations of the purpose and scope of the privilege have
waivered, the court asserted that the fundamental underpinnings
remain consistent.248 The Second Circuit agreed with the other
circuits that promotion of the public interest is an integral factor in
considering the applicability of the privilege.249
The court

240. In re County of Erie, 473 F.3d 413, 419 (2d Cir. 2007).
241. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 399 F.3d 527, 528 (2d Cir. 2005).
242. Id. at 528–29.
243. See id. at 529.
244. See id. at 530 (noting that it was “undisputed that the grand jury need[ed] the
information it [sought] to obtain from Ms. George,” the district court concluded that
“[r]eason and experience dictate that, in the grand jury context, any governmental
attorney-client privilege must yield because the interests served by the grand jury’s
fact-finding process clearly outweigh the interest served by the privilege”).
245. Id.
246. Id. (“Our determination of whether the Office of the Governor may claim a
privilege, then, requires us to ascertain ‘the principles of the common law’ and to
apply them ‘in the light of reason and experience.’ In doing so . . . Rule 501 plainly
requires that we apply the federal law of privilege.”).
247. Id.
248. Id. at 531.
249. See id. (“Nevertheless, courts have by reason and experience concluded that a
consistent application of the privilege over time is necessary to promote the rule of
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distinguished its opinion by arguing that the public interest is not as
clear as other courts contend.250
The court rejected the idea that the privilege should be weaker in
the government context.251 While recognizing an inherent difference
between public and private lawyers, the Second Circuit found no
reason to “jettison [the] principle” supporting the attorney-client
privilege.252 The court also found the argument that government
lawyers could consult private counsel in criminal matters insufficient
to weaken the privilege.253 Rather than creating a balancing test, the
court recognized the traditional doctrines that seek to limit
“egregious abuses” of the privilege.254
The court found the
Government’s arguments over the functionality of the privilege in the
grand jury context to be “illusory” and “potentially dangerous.”255 In
reversing the district court, the Second Circuit did not “extend” the
privilege, but rather argued against its abrogation in the government
context.256

2. In re County of Erie
The Second Circuit re-visited the government attorney-client
privilege in a 2007 case involving a § 1983 claim against
unconstitutional strip searches in the Erie County Correctional
Facility.257 The exertion of the privilege revolved around e-mail
documents concerning the policy and legal ramifications of the
program of strip searches.258 While the central focus of the case
concerned the content of the “privileged” documents, the court reasserted the necessity for a government lawyer attorney-client
privilege.259 Noting that the privilege “accommodates competing
law by encouraging consultation with lawyers, and ensuring that lawyers, once
consulted, are able to render to their clients fully informed legal advice.”).
250. See id. at 534 (“One could as easily conclude . . . that the protections afforded
by the privilege ultimately promote the public interest, even when they might impede
the search for truth in a particular criminal investigation.”).
251. See id. (“We believe that, if anything, the traditional rationale for the
privilege applies with special force in the government context.”).
252. Id. at 535.
253. See id.
254. Id. (noting that the “crime-fraud exception” is one such traditional limitation).
255. Id. at 536.
256. Id. (“[W]e have simply refused to countenance its abrogation in circumstances
to which its venerable and worthy purposes fully pertain.”).
257. See In re County of Erie, 473 F.3d 413, 415–16 (2d Cir. 2007).
258. See id. at 416.
259. Id. at 416–22.
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values,” the Second Circuit reasoned this accommodation is
“sharpened” in the government lawyer context.260 According to the
court, legal advice given to government officials who formulate policy
is fundamental to “promot[ing] broader public interests.”261

3.

Categorical Arguments for Government Attorney-Client
Privilege in Federal Grand Jury Context

Courts and commentators offer varying justifications for support of
the government attorney-client privilege generally, as well as in the
narrow context of a federal grand jury. One such justification for the
government attorney-client privilege can be found in the leading
treatise on federal practice and procedure.262 The rationale for the
privilege there is:
1) Other governmental privileges do not deal with the unique
requirements of attorney confidentiality; 2) the court’s ability to
apply the privilege to private parties may be a better source of
regulation than expanding other government privileges; 3) denying
elected officials open discussions about pending litigation with
counsel would be detrimental to society as a whole; 4) full and frank
disclosure is just as important in the public context as it is in the
private context; 5) without the privilege, government may be
required to fight with one hand behind its back; and 6) when a
municipality has its own staff of lawyers, courts may analogize the
privilege as applied to in-house corporate counsel.263

Supporters of the government attorney-client privilege in the grand
jury context rely upon several of these principles when invoking their
arguments. This section will focus upon four predominant rationales
upon which courts and commentators consistently rely. They are
presented in order of how they are addressed by the opposition
against the assertion of a government attorney-client privilege for the
sake of continuity.

260. Id. at 418–19 (“On the one hand, non-disclosure impinges on open and
accessible government. On the other hand, public officials are duty-bound to
understand and respect constitutional, judicial and statutory limitations on their
authority; thus, their access to candid legal advice directly and significantly serves the
public interest.” (citations omitted)).
261. Id. at 419.
262. See Salkin, supra note 33, at 288.
263. See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 49, at 127–28.
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Corporate Analogy Is Relevant to a Consideration of the
Government Attorney-Client Privilege

Because the government attorney-client privilege is an
organizational privilege, it is argued that an understanding of the
privilege in the corporate context is relevant.264 The drafters of the
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers suggest that the
rationale and objectives of the organizational attorney-client privilege
“apply in general to governmental clients.”265 Supporters of applying
the Upjohn entity privilege to the government note that the case did
not center on the fact that a corporation could not be prosecuted for a
crime.266 Rather, they focus on the need for government officials to
receive sound legal advice, similar to that of officials in positions of
responsibility for corporations.267 Scholars contend that the attorneyclient privilege “is intended to encourage employees and officials to
disclose the truth” so that their organizations and entities are in
“compliance with the law.”268 As Professor Rice argues, for any
justification of the privilege in the corporate context, “the need within
the government is equal, if not greater.”269
Another aspect of Upjohn pointed to by supporters is its
consistency with supporting the public interest.270 Allowing a
corporation to use the privilege provides corporate counsel an
opportunity to make significant efforts to provide legal advice in
areas that are “hardly . . . instinctive.”271 Judge Tatel found protecting
legal advice essential in his dissenting opinion arguing for the
preservation of the attorney-client privilege for President Clinton.272

264. See Ellinwood, supra note 43, at 1303.
265. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 74 cmt. b
(2000).
266. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 931 (8th Cir. 1997)
(Kopf, J., dissenting).
267. See Stacy Lynn Newman, Comment, The Governmental Attorney-Client

Privilege: Whether the Right to Evidence in A State Grand Jury Investigation Pierces
the Privilege in New York State, 70 ALB. L. REV. 741, 756–57 (2007).
268. Id. at 757.
269. 1 PAUL R. RICE, JOHN BERNARD, & DAVID DRYSDALE, ATTORNEY-CLIENT
PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES § 4:28 (2d ed. 1999).
270. See Chud, supra note 21, at 1710.
271. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 392 (1981).
272. In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1285 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (Tatel, J., dissenting)
(“[T]he unique protection the law affords a President’s communications with White
House counsel rests . . . on the special nature of legal advice, and its special need for
confidentiality, as recognized by centuries of common law.”).
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To provide sufficient legal advice a steady line of communication
between government officials and their lawyers is necessary.273

b. Denying Elected Officials Open Discussions About Pending
Litigation with Counsel Would Be Detrimental to Society as a Whole
The second justification offered is that recognizing “the privilege in
the grand jury context is consistent with the public interest.”274
Building upon the reasoning of Upjohn, the argument states that a
client’s capacity to modify their behavior in accordance with the law
clearly supports the public interest.275 One commentator argues
“[t]here is no reason why this logic does not apply to government
organizations.”276 Applying it there becomes even easier, as the
government employee has a duty to comply with the law.277 This is
further compounded by acknowledging that the “[p]ublic sentiment
that calls for corporate accountability resonates with the public trust”
required of government officials.278
Seeking “legal advice early on” also promotes efficient
administration of the government by preventing bad policies from
being implemented.279 The government lawyer’s role at this stage to
“ascertain[] the factual background and sift[] through the facts with
an eye to the legally relevant.”280 Further, scholars argue this impacts
the capacity of a lawyer to provide zealous representation to the
client.281 Charles Ruff, former White House Counsel, argued for a
recognition of the privilege even in the aftermath of In re Lindsey.282

273. See Blumenauer, supra note 15, at 83.
274. See Chud, supra note 21, at 1710.
275. Id. at 1710–11.
276. See Ellinwood, supra note 43, at 1330.
277. See Chud, supra note 21, at 1711; see also Clark, supra note 3, at 1072.
278. Salkin, supra note 33, at 287.
279. See Salkin & Phillips, supra note 13, at 585–86.
280. See Paulsen, supra note 22, at 497 (quoting Upjohn v. United States, 499 U.S.
383, 390–91 (1981)).
281. Catherine J. Lanctot, The Duty of Zealous Advocacy and the Ethics of the
Federal Government Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 951,
986 (1991).
282. Stephen Labaton, Testing of a President: The Supreme Court; Administration
Loses Two Legal Battles Against Starr, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1998, at A19.
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Full and Frank Disclosure Is Just as Important in the Public
Context as It Is in the Private Context

It is often asserted that the attorney-client privilege “encourage[s]
full and frank communications between attorneys and their clients”
by rendering certain communications confidential.283 One student
commentator suggests a focus on this need to “encourage[] open and
honest discussion between lawyer and client.”284 This would allow the
client to know the full scope of the “testimonial privilege” before
divulging otherwise privileged information.285 This may be even more
relevant when the client potentially faces adverse action in the scope
of a criminal investigation.286 Denying them the fundamental
privilege would weaken the efforts for open and honest government
as officials would be reluctant “come forward without the protection
of the attorney-client privilege.”287
Judge Tatel, in his dissenting opinion, argued that the need for “full
and frank communication” allows a government attorney the
opportunity to provide “reliable legal advice.”288 In his view, the
majority opinion against the government attorney-client privilege will
serve to “chill communications” between officials and their
government lawyers.289 This would have the impact of putting the
government at a disadvantage in litigation.290 Further, contrary to the
public interest, it would force government officials to seek private
counsel in order to avoid disclosure.291 Thus, even though it can
potentially block “the factfinder’s access to potentially relevant
evidence,” the privilege can “enhance[] the quality of representation
and promote[] accurate truth-finding by providing attorneys with
more information.”292
283. Daily & Thornquist, supra note 110, at 585 (quoting United States v. Zolin,
491 U.S. 554, 562 (1989)).
284. See Chud, supra note 21, at 1709.
285. Id. at 1710.
286. Id.
287. Toporek, supra note 29, at 2428.
288. In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (Tatel, J., dissenting).
289. Id. (“[B]y the rule the court adopts today, the chilling effect is precisely the
same. Clients . . . will avoid confiding in their lawyers because they can never know
whether the information they share, no matter how innocent, might some day
become pertinent to possible criminal violations.” (citations omitted)).
290. Damin, supra note 5, at 1034.
291. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 931 (8th Cir. 1997)
(Kopf, J., dissenting) (arguing that suggesting an official should seek private counsel
“misses the point for extending the privilege to organizations”).
292. See Greenberg, supra note 89, at 945.
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Other Privileges Do Not Deal with the Unique Requirements of
Attorney Confidentiality

Another justification supporting the privilege is the client’s need to
determine whether the actions he took will give rise to adverse
litigation either in a criminal or civil forum.293 This focus on the
procedural aspect of seeking advice is not always necessarily rooted in
an attempt to avoid disclosure.294 For those seeking to obtain advice
to shield them from clear violations of the law, it is argued that the
privilege should not be allowed.295 This prohibition would apply
whether the advice was being obtained for civil or criminal matters.296
Some argue that those who are uncertain of whether their actions are
criminal should receive the privilege’s protection.297
This process would allow for the client to know whether his actions
might result in some form of culpability.298 Supporters of this
principle argue that forcing the client to seek the advice of private
counsel would “significantly reduce the effectiveness” in seeking the
assistance of government counsel.299 It could result in the client
seeking private counsel arbitrarily and keeping information from the
public, thus undermining the public interest.300 There are adequate
mechanisms in place, including the crime-fraud exception, to address
any potential wrongdoing.301 Scholars argue that the crime-fraud
exception “is an effective check on any potential abuse of the
attorney-client privilege.”302 It would help to prevent government
lawyers from using “taxpayer’s money” to protect a government
official from attempts at “perpetrating criminal activity and fraud.”303
The client of a government attorney has a reduced “legitimate
expectation that its lawyers will remain silent” under these

293. See Chud, supra note 21, at 1711–12.
294. Id. at 1712.
295. Ellinwood, supra note 43, at 1326.
296. Salkin & Phillips, supra note 13, at 584 (“[T]he Supreme Court has explicitly
rejected the notion that the attorney-client privilege should be applied differently in
different situations.”).
297. See Damin, supra note 5, at 1039.
298. Chud, supra note 21, at 1712.
299. Id.
300. See Damin, supra note 5, at 1035; see also Dickmann, supra note 20, at 308.
301. See Ellinwood, supra note 43, at 1327.
302. See Salkin & Phillips, supra note 13, at 588; see also Lance Cole, Revoking

Our Privileges: Federal Law Enforcement’s Multi-Front Assault on the AttorneyClient Privilege (and Why It Is Misguided), 48 VILL. L. REV. 469, 507 (2003).
303. See Damin, supra note 5, at 1042.
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circumstances.304 Preventing fraudulent use of government resources
suffices to protect the public interest.305
III. RESOLVING THE UNCLEAR STANDARD FOR THE
GOVERNMENT ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE CRIMINAL
CONTEXT
The attorney-client privilege is a historically rooted common law
exception that has ethical implications for all lawyers. Private lawyers
and their respective clients have long enjoyed the fruits of this
privilege. For government lawyers, however, the privilege has not
been observed with as much principled certainty despite the similarity
in their occupation and professional responsibility requirements.
Certainly, extending the privilege to government lawyers in the civil
context has not been a contentious issue for the courts.306 The
problem that has arisen is whether in the federal grand jury context
the government attorney can assert the privilege. While this is a
narrow area of law to consider, it highlights just how cautious courts
have been when abrogating or extending the privilege. For the
jurisdictions that have ruled on this issue, hesitation exists for
government lawyers when deciding whether their communications
with their clients are protected by the privilege. This hesitation then
spirals into an “uncertain privilege,” against which the Supreme
Court has emphatically cautioned.307 The unfortunate results would
include impeding effective government and subjugating the public
interest. Government officials, no matter their level of legal
expertise, need adequate legal counsel to make informed decisions
regarding their actions, particularly if there is potential for criminal
liability.
To avoid this problem, a return to focusing on the fundamental
ethical considerations of the attorney-client privilege is necessary.
The predominant principles and underlying rationales of the
attorney-client privilege support that it applies to all attorneys, not
just those in the private sector.308 In fact, it has been argued that it

304. See Moliterno, supra note 10, at 645.
305. Ellinwood, supra note 43, at 1318 (“Those officials who have clearly violated
the law will not receive the benefit of government counsel so government resources
will not be used for their assistance.”).
306. See discussion supra Part II.
307. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981).
308. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 74 (2000).
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may even have more validity “in the government context.”309 To see
if the underlying principles apply, it is important first to identify who
is the client that the lawyer is serving.310 Once the client is
established, a government lawyer will know to what extent the
privilege covers their communications with the client, and what
inherent limitations exist. The Supreme Court has made it clear there
is no separate privilege that criminal and civil litigators enjoy.311 This
is especially true in the realm of a government lawyer advocating on
behalf of their client. Obfuscating the privilege in the criminal
context for these attorneys would “be a prohibition upon professional
advice and assistance.”312
The crime-fraud exception provides the necessary procedural
safeguards to adequately serve the government lawyers potentially
dual-hatted role of owing loyalty to the client and a “duty” to the
people.313 It is one of the “well-established exceptions” to the
privilege that Wright and Graham reference in their treatise.314 A
faithful application of it would protect the public interest, while still
providing the opportunity for “full and frank communications.”315
The crime-fraud exception can discourage actions that would
undermine the public interest by using the privilege to withhold
information. The crime-fraud exception also helps to prevent an
abuse of the ethical role and responsibilities stemming from the
attorney-client relationship.316
A. The Client of a Government Attorney Is the Organization
They Serve
According to Model Rule 1.13, an attorney representing an
organizational client “represents the organization acting through its
duly authorized constituents.”317 For the government lawyer, this

309. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 399 F.3d 527, 534 (2d Cir. 2005).
310. Dickmann, supra note 20, at 314–15 (recommending that “government
attorneys should warn government officials from the outset that they represent the
governmental entity, not the individual official.”).
311. Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 408–09 (1998) (“However,
there is no case authority for the proposition that the privilege applies differently in
criminal and civil cases, and only one commentator ventures such a suggestion.”).
312. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U.S. 457, 458 (1876).
313. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 399 F.3d at 535.
314. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 49.
315. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
316. See Brown, supra note 111, at 1263.
317. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(a) (2012).
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means that the privilege covers “communications made by
subordinate officers . . . for purposes of enabling the attorney to give
legal advice to the government, as an organization.”318 It is important
for the government lawyer to avoid any potential conflicts of interest
that might arise in representing the organization and/or the duly
appointed constituent.319
In these situations, the government lawyer should be “subject to
the same ethical rules” as those serving in the private sector.320 The
practical implications of this argument, however, are difficult to
narrow to such a bright-line rule. Often a government employee who
is seeking advice from counsel will not necessarily know what they
have done that could ultimately render them culpable. Judge Tatel
argues that this would create an unfortunate situation where the
client is forced to “shift their trust . . . to private counsel.”321 This
would undermine the public interest in open and honest government
as the client would not bear the burden of disclosing communications
that affect the citizenry.
Further, this would complicate the
representation of counsel when it is unclear if civil or criminal liability
is at stake.322
There are times when the government attorney can “stand in the
shoes of private counsel” and represent the employee in their
individual litigation.323 It is important to note, however, that the
privilege does not extend to a government official once they are “no
longer in office.”324 A government entity’s capacity to waive the
privilege stands as a safeguard in these situations where the public
interest would be better served by disclosure of the information. This
effectively gives the government entity the ability to decide whether
the “relevant public interests” are in line with their ability to assert
the privilege.325 It cannot be presumed that the entity will always

318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.

See Paulsen, supra note 22, at 474.
Id.
Josephson & Pearce, supra note 4, at 541.
In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (Tatel, J., dissenting).
See Chud, supra note 21, at 1713–15.
In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1269.
Ariel B. Denbo, Comment, In re Grand Jury Investigation: Do Government
Officials Enjoy the Same Attorney-Client Privilege as Private Citizens?, 30 AM. J.
TRIAL ADVOC. 231, 240–41 (2006).
325. Blumenauer, supra note 15, at 78.
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waive the privilege, however, and thus this does not render additional
safeguards as superfluous.326
B.

The Underlying Principles Support the Privilege in the
Federal Grand Jury Context

There is little doubt that the attorney-client privilege is an
important evidentiary tool that attorneys use. Critics of the historical
importance of the privilege do not dispute the need for the
privilege.327 It is true that the privilege’s initial roots of honor and
fealty have gone asunder. They have been replaced, however, by
ethical obligations, professional responsibility codes, and the desire to
encourage “full and frank communications” with the client.328
Encouraging clients to confide openly to their counsel serves the
public interest.329 This is of paramount importance for a government
attorney who advocates for an agency and through this representation
represents the public.
Critics of a robust government attorney privilege continually assert
that government employees have unique obligations to serve the
public.330 This uniqueness does not abrogate “the traditional duty of
zealous advocacy.”331 Zealous representation directly conflicts with
Professor Leslie’s argument that the privilege should be a limited
justification employed only in trial preparation.332 Limiting the
privilege to only those situations would deprive the client of the
ability to receive the fullest scope of representation. This would
certainly impact the public interest, which is promoted when the
client “receive[s] well-founded, fact-specific legal advice.”333 The
drafters of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers
recognized the privilege as a foundational element that impacts the

326. The Office of the Governor declined to waive the privilege in In re Grand
Jury Investigation. 399 F.3d 527, 530 (2d Cir. 2005).
327. See Hazard, supra note 49, at 1062 (“There is no responsible opinion
suggesting that the privilege be completely abolished.”).
328. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 348 (1985).
329. In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (Tatel, J., dissenting).
330. See supra Part II.A.2 and accompanying notes.
331. Lanctot, supra note 281, at 1013.
332. See Leslie, supra note 69, at 528.
333. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 926 (8th Cir. 1997)
(Kopf, J., dissenting).
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adversarial process for both government lawyers and those in the
private sector.334
Though the privilege can stand in “derogation of the search for
truth,” it serves as an inherent part of our adversarial system. As
noted previously, there are several limitations on the privilege that
impact its potentially expansive reach.335 But even in the face of
disclosure requirements for public requests of information, there have
been carve-outs to protect the privilege.336 These exemptions give
strength to the argument that the attorney-client privilege is a unique
testamentary provision that remains viable even in a system of open
government.
Creating an “uncertain privilege” goes against the Court’s
precedent and general matters of professional responsibility.337
Allowing the privilege to be sustained in the federal grand jury
context does not create an unnecessary expansion. Though courts
often have relied on “reason and experience” to decide the scope of
the privilege in these circumstances, it is a fundamental principle of
jurisprudence that reasonable minds can differ.338 This does not bode
well for a government lawyer who may be called upon to disclose
information during a highly contentious investigation. While there is
no doubt that the public has an interest in the fair adjudication of
federal crimes, it should be strongly considered that the privilege
already serves a narrow role.339
Not allowing the privilege in the criminal context of a federal grand
jury creates two problems. First, it is almost certain to impede the
government by imposing a “chilling effect” on attorney-client
communications.340 Individuals seeking the counsel of an attorney
will not always be certain of their guilt. This uncertainty is certainly
not a feature unique to those working with government lawyers. The
law is so varied and complex that it is essential for clients to receive
information in a candid and confidential manner from attorneys so
that they can make informed decisions regarding their prospective
courses of action. Though those involved in public corruption cases
tend to be unsympathetic representatives of a strong attorney-client
334. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 68 cmt. c
(2000).
335. See supra Part I.D.
336. In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
337. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 18 (1996).
338. FED. R. EVID. 501.
339. Diversified Indus. Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 602 (8th Cir. 1977).
340. In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1284 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
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privilege,341 a limitation of the privilege cannot be justified solely on
this basis.
Secondly, denying the privilege would lead to the creation of a
demarcation line between the privilege asserted in civil litigation and
criminal litigation. Fracturing the privilege along types of litigation
most likely results in impacting both “good faith” and bad faith
requests for counsel.342 The principles supporting extension of the
privilege to criminal investigations of government officials are not so
far astray from those confronting private lawyers. Judge Kopf argues
that the lack of case law on point “is meaningless” in creating a
“distinction for criminal cases” under Rule 503.343 There is little
doubt that officials have a need for a “complete and accurate factual
picture” in the face of a federal grand jury investigation.344 Forcing an
immediate reliance upon private counsel in those situations would
only exacerbate the uncertainty surrounding the privilege. There is
no principled basis for this proposition under the attorney-client
privilege. Our Constitution even offers some valid support to the
privilege given its impact upon the assistance of counsel.345
C.

The Crime-Fraud Exception Is Sufficient to Protect the
Public Interest

Courts that have applied a balancing test to determine if the
privilege should be abrogated in the face of a grand jury proceeding
have failed to recognize that sufficient safeguards are in place to
prevent an abuse of the privilege and a dilution of taxpayer’s funds in
bad faith. They argue that the public interest can only be served
through full disclosure.
The controversy surrounding federal
government attorney-client privilege involves the public’s concern
over potential government secrecy. James Madison’s letter quite
possibly serves as a call to arms for proponents of this argument.346
Courts have questioned how faithfully the public interest would be
341. Steven Yaccino, Then There Was One: An Illinois Ex-Governor Released
from Prison, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2013, at A14 (noting that there have been “four
Illinois governors who have been found guilty of wrongdoing in recent history, along
with hundreds of public officials and business leaders charged with public corruption
in recent decades”).
342. Damin, supra note 5, at 1033.
343. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 929 (8th Cir. 1997)
(Kopf, J., dissenting).
344. Id. at 930.
345. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
346. In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1273–74 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
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served by allowing the privilege in the grand jury context.347 But, if
this is true, then what becomes of the right to secrecy in what can be
considered the most adversarial of proceedings?
The crime-fraud exception addresses the public interest concern
wholly. By not allowing the “seal of secrecy” to extend to
communications made in furtherance of a crime or fraud, the public’s
interest is served.348 This “ensure[s] that the truth is revealed in
situations where a compelling public good” is in conflict with a
client’s invocation of the privilege.349 Invoking the exception would
also avoid any unnecessary judicial balancing in determining
competing public interests. All a court would have to do is determine
if the party asserting the crime-fraud exception had met their prima
facie showing and proceed forward with their inspection of the
communication. These procedural protections would allow a neutral
member of the court to consider the weight of the evidence in
determining if the privilege can be pierced.
It is true that other reporting requirements limit the privilege in
criminal investigations of wrongdoing.350 The Restatement (Third) of
the Law Governing Lawyers does recognize the impact of statutory
The fact that these reporting
obligations on the privilege.351
requirements exist, however, shows the strength of the privilege
rather than its weakness. If the privilege were weakened in this
context, then having statutorily imposed reporting requirements
would be superfluous at best. That is why the crime-fraud exception
can be utilized to protect the privilege from abuse. It is not necessary
to employ a balancing test to determine if the privilege should be
overcome, the crime-fraud exception serves that purpose already.352
Employing the crime-fraud exception is not a very arduous burden
for opposing counsel to overcome if that is necessary. Moreover, it
serves as a sufficient safeguard to prevent the privilege from
becoming absolute. For those concerned with the abrogation of the
privilege, the crime-fraud exception does not result in the immediate
release of confidential information to opposing counsel.353 This
347. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 920–21.
348. Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888).
349. Dickmann, supra note 20, at 295.
350. In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1274–75.
351. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 74 cmt. b (2000)
(“A narrower privilege for governmental clients may be warranted by particular
statutory formulations.”).
352. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 936.
353. United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 572 (1989).
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review of the communications over which confidentiality is claimed
allows the court to determine whether the necessity exists under this
exception to admit the material. Having this power concentrated in
the court keeps the system of employing the exception from
becoming arbitrary. Again, while reasonable minds can differ, it is
quite possible that courts evaluating communications for evidence of
crime or fraud will “know it when [they] see it.”354
CONCLUSION
Government lawyers play an integral part in our democratic
system. It is therefore imperative that the officials they serve are able
to discuss legal matters with them under the protections of the
attorney-client privilege. Depriving them of this capacity would force
the government official to seek advice outside the system of public
This consequence could make “government[]
accountability.355
investigations more difficult” or render them “impossible.”356 The
result would contradict the public interest for which these officials
and lawyers are duty-bound to serve.357
The fundamental principles of the privilege do not support its
limitation for government clients in the face of a federal grand jury
subpoena. There is no reason to “jettison a principle” as essential to
responsible lawyering as the attorney-client privilege.358 The ability of
the agency to waive the privilege only serves to show how critical it is
to promoting attorney-client communications. It is unnecessary to
create more exceptions to the privilege than necessary.359 The
primary role of the privilege is to encourage open and honest
dialogue between government lawyers and the individual seeking
assistance. Only when the opposing counsel satisfies their prima facie
showing should procedural steps be taken to overcome the privilege.
The crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege achieves
this process. Anything else would be a “derogation of the public
interest.”360

354. Jacobellis v. State of Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964).
355. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 399 F.3d 527, 534 (2d Cir. 2005).
356. See 1 PAUL R. RICE, JOHN BERNARD, & DAVID DRYSDALE, ATTORNEYCLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES § 4:28 (2d ed. 1999).
357. See Bell, supra note 27, at 1069.
358. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 399 F.3d at 535.
359. Id.
360. Blumenauer, supra note 15, at 78.

